Russia’s interference no longer works in Moldova

As Moldovans prepare for elections on October 20, it looks like another round of the familiar geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West over lands in Moscow’s former empire and sphere of influence. In a crucial referendum, Moldovans will vote on whether to seek membership in the European Union. They will also have to choose between Maia Sandu, the pro-European incumbent president with a reformist agenda, and a cohort of pro-Russian candidates with varying degrees of radicalism.

Russia is using its usual influence operations to undermine the small country’s path to Western institutions. There is ample evidence of Russian interference, and the sums Moscow funnels to its proxies are unprecedented in Moldovan politics. In addition to paying tens of thousands of Moldovans to vote against EU membership and funding pro-Moscow candidates, Russia is doubling down on its usual tactic of using shady oligarchs to try to capture the state. Finally, there is Transnistria – a Russian-occupied part of Moldova next to Ukraine. It is a typical frozen conflict and another proven strategy by Moscow to put pressure on countries it wants to control. Although the threat of a Russian invasion of Moldova from Transnistria is currently extremely low as Russia is busy fighting Ukraine, this could change at any time in the future.

As Moldovans prepare for elections on October 20, it looks like another round of the familiar geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West over lands in Moscow’s former empire and sphere of influence. In a crucial referendum, Moldovans will vote on whether to seek membership in the European Union. They will also have to choose between Maia Sandu, the pro-European incumbent president with a reformist agenda, and a cohort of pro-Russian candidates with varying degrees of radicalism.

Russia is using its usual influence operations to undermine the small country’s path to Western institutions. There is ample evidence of Russian interference, and the sums Moscow funnels to its proxies are unprecedented in Moldovan politics. In addition to paying tens of thousands of Moldovans to vote against EU membership and funding pro-Moscow candidates, Russia is doubling down on its usual tactic of using shady oligarchs to try to capture the state. Finally, there is Transnistria – a Russian-occupied part of Moldova next to Ukraine. It is a typical frozen conflict and another proven strategy by Moscow to put pressure on countries it wants to control. Although the threat of a Russian invasion of Moldova from Transnistria is currently extremely low as Russia is busy fighting Ukraine, this could change at any time in the future.

But the clash of pro-Russian political forces in Moldova in the run-up to the elections is hardly a sign of Moscow’s strength and sophistication. Instead, the Kremlin appears to have failed to adapt its election-influencing strategies to the new realities of politics in Moldova – particularly the decline in support for Russia since its invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Today, even some of the pro-Russian politicians support EU membership and try to avoid too close ties with Moscow.

Long after Moldova gained independence through the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kremlin remained a powerful force in the politics of its former possessions. It rewards its favorites with generous funding and receptions in Moscow and punishes unfavorable Moldovan governments with trade bans and gas price increases. Today, Russia still plays a large role in Moldovan public opinion, although Moldova has severed most official relations between the two countries since the invasion began. According to a 2024 survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI), 71 percent of Moldovans surveyed said that relations with Russia are currently very bad or somewhat bad, compared to just 11 percent who said this about the EU. But only 46 percent of Moldovans see Russia as a medium or major threat to their country, while 53 percent see it as one of the country’s most important economic partners – behind only the EU at 66 percent and neighboring Romania at 69 percent. Half of those surveyed also see Russia as one of the country’s most important political partners.

But it is questionable whether Moscow can use this continued popularity to change this weekend’s vote, which is expected to be in favor of Sandu and EU membership. Moldova’s left-leaning parties, which have historically been pro-Russian, still command around 40 percent support. But they found it difficult to adapt their narrative to Russia’s brutal war next door.

Since the invasion began, many on the Moldovan left have worked to shed their image as Russian stooges. Some, like popular Chisinau mayor Ion Ceban and former prime minister Ion Chicu, have tried to reinvent themselves as centrist pro-Europeans. They have abandoned their former party, the powerful Party of Socialists of Moldova (PSRM), badly hampered by previous cooperation with the Kremlin, and founded their own political movements. Their new pro-EU views have drawn much skepticism, but they have already attracted around 10 percent support, especially among Moldovans who are both dissatisfied with Sandu and disillusioned with Moscow.

The rest of the PSRM has proven to be less agile. The party’s leader, former Moldovan President Igor Dodon, is notorious for his close ties with Moscow. But as the presidential election loomed, the party tried to adapt to Russia’s waning influence by sidelining Dodon and nominating former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoianoglo as its candidate. While Stoianoglu also emphasizes the need for cooperation with Moscow, he has a proven record of supporting EU integration and is widely perceived as a moderate. It is difficult to determine the actual state of his relations with the Kremlin, but his cautious rhetoric and low-budget campaign suggest that Russia is not entirely behind him.

This time, Russian money appears to be directed elsewhere. Moldovan police recently said that more than $15 million was transferred from Russia to bank accounts linked to fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor in September alone.

Shor, who was sentenced in absentia to prison for his role in a fraud involving nearly $1 billion siphoned from Moldovan banks, embodies another typical Kremlin strategy: influence over a country through Russia-friendly oligarchs. This has long been an important part of Russia’s strategy for gaining control of Ukraine, Georgia and other countries.

But the bet on Shor, who has Russian citizenship and lives in Moscow, suggests that the Kremlin has reached the limits of its oligarch strategy. In fact, there could hardly be a more incompetent person tasked with winning over Moldovan voters. Shor is widely regarded as a corrupt crook; At 58 percent, he has the highest negative rating among a long list of politicians in the IRI poll. He is so unpopular that researchers have found that his activities actually increase support for Sandu. His talking points – sharp criticism of the EU and praise for the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union – appear more aimed at appealing to his friends in the Kremlin than to most of Moldova’s voters.

For Moscow, Shor is a reliable surrogate because he is well-versed in the underbelly of Moldovan politics, structures his campaign to suit the Kremlin’s worldview, and is such a toxic figure that he couldn’t even betray Russia if he wanted to . This last quality – absolute loyalty – has become the most important and almost only criterion for Moscow when selecting its allies.

In the few elections that Shor’s movement has won – such as the regional elections in Gagauzia and Orhei – they have been accused of massive vote buying. If recent reports of vote buying are true, it is unclear how effective this tactic will be. Most of the 130,000 Moldovans who were reportedly bribed by Shor’s associates to vote against EU membership were most likely already favorable to Moscow. In the presidential election, neither Shor’s candidate Vasile Bolea nor Shor’s Victory bloc were allowed to register due to financial irregularities.

Shor may still support one of the opposition candidates in this weekend’s vote, but that probably won’t make much of a difference. The election promises to be a major blow to Russia’s continued influence in Moldova. Recent polls suggest that the referendum will confirm majority support for EU integration, while Sandu will be re-elected by a wide margin in the presidential election and the moderate left opposition will gain the upper hand over the pro-Russian radicals.

In freeing itself from Russian influence, Moldova still faces the hurdle of next year’s parliamentary elections, where a clear and overwhelming victory for Sandu and her allies is not guaranteed. But Russia’s war has brought Moldova’s politics closer to a point where all major forces agree that integration with the West is good for the country, a development that many other post-communist states have already undergone.

This reality causes pro-Russian puppetmasters like Shor to remain on the fringes of political life, even if Moldova one day allows him to return without serving his sentence. But the frozen leadership in the Kremlin doesn’t seem to care. Moscow prefers loyal lackeys and familiar methods, even if they end up driving Moldovans even further away from Russia.