China’s submarine disaster in Wuhan

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On September 26, 2024 The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that a Chinese nuclear submarine sank off the pier at the Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan. The submarine, manufactured by the state-owned China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), was in final equipment at the time of the accident. The incident occurred in May-June 2024 and a retired US Navy submariner discovered it using satellite images and shared it on his X account (formerly known as Twitter). These images showed that large cranes had arrived at the scene of the accident to recover the half-sunken submarine. By July 2024, these cranes had disappeared and a recovered submarine was placed nearby. However, China remained silent about the incident, which only became public when the WSJ reported it.

Chinese social media campaigners and various experts have questioned the credibility of the WSJ report and put forward alternative arguments.

Since then, the Chinese government and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) have remained silent about the accident. Meanwhile, Chinese social media warriors and various experts have questioned the credibility of the WSJ report and put forward alternative arguments. In light of this event, this article examines the accident and assesses China’s submarine capabilities.

The identification of the submarine

At first glance, confusion remains as to the submarine’s identity, as several Chinese and Western sources, although not NATO, have referred to it as a Type 41 Zhou-class submarine. This ship is a development of China’s Type 39A Yuan-class submarines, slightly larger in size and displacement, measuring about 83 to 85 meters in length and weighing about 4,000 tons.

In addition, contrary to initial reports, this submarine is not said to be a fully nuclear boat like China’s other submarines. Traditionally, China’s nuclear submarine program operates under Project 09, with the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s nuclear submarines assigned to the Type 09X classification. In this series, odd-numbered types denote attack submarines, while even-numbered types denote ballistic missile submarines. For example, the Type 91 Han class, the Type 93/A/B Shang class, and the planned Type 95 Sui class are all attack submarines, while the Xia class is the Type 92, the Jin class of Type 94 and the future Tang class of Type 96 are nuclear ballistic missile submarines. These nuclear submarines are over 100 meters long and have a displacement of around 6,000 tons or more. These differences led to initial confusion regarding the Type-41 and its classification as a nuclear submarine in the PLA Navy.

Table 1: China’s nuclear submarines

Submarine series	type	status	number	In service appointments
Type 91 Han class	Nuclear attack submarine	Some are retired, in reserve	5	Since 1974
Type 92 Xia class	Nuclear missile submarine	Semi-retired, experimental	1	1983
Type 93/A/B Shang class	Nuclear attack/cruise submarine	In operation + building	6+1	Since 2006
Type 94 Jin class	Nuclear missile submarine	On duty	6	Since 2007
Type 95 Sui class	Nuclear attack submarine	Planned
Type 96 Tang class	Nuclear missile submarine	Planned

According to older reports, this submarine is a diesel-electric boat with a low-power, low-pressure auxiliary nuclear power plant designed to generate electricity and recharge batteries. The development of this auxiliary reactor was reportedly supported by Russian nuclear reactor manufacturers who have experience in this technology. In 2020, Russia and China signed an agreement to cooperate on this capability, and recently, in early September 2024, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell expressed concerns about this cooperation.

This small auxiliary reactor replaces the Stirling engine Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system found in China’s other diesel-electric submarines, improving their ability to remain submerged for extended periods. Chinese news agencies have claimed that the Type 41-class submarine’s small reactor requires minimal maintenance and produces little underwater noise. If produced in larger numbers, this submarine could form an effective hunting pack capable of challenging modern Western nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in China’s adjacent waters.

Nuclear capacity in Wuhan

Wuchang Shipyard, alongside Jiangnan Shipyard, has traditionally focused on building diesel-electric submarines, mainly Yuan-class Type 39 ships. Currently, it lacks approval and certification from the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) for handling nuclear materials. Only the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, Liaoning is certified to build nuclear submarines. This raises questions about the Wuchang Shipyard’s ability to build this submarine.

A joint research and development center for new energy ship propulsion technologies was established in Wuchang in cooperation with Wuhan University of Technology, focusing on future engine technologies.

However, Wuhan is home to China’s 701 Ship Research and Design Center, which specializes in the design of large ships and submarines. In addition, the 719 Second Ship Design and Research Institute, which designs nuclear submarines, is based in Wuhan, as is the 105 Institute of the China National Nuclear Corporation, which researches nuclear energy. In addition, a joint research and development center for new energy ship propulsion technologies was established in Wuchang in cooperation with Wuhan University of Technology, focusing on future engine technologies. In addition, the Wuchang Shipyard has undergone significant expansion since 2012 and is currently executing export contracts for conventional submarines to Pakistan. So if the People’s Liberation Army Navy were to pursue the design of a hybrid submarine with conventional propulsion and an auxiliary nuclear reactor, the Wuchang Shipyard would be a suitable location for such a project.

Complications: Transfer from Wuhan to the sea

The Wuchang Shipyard is located in the hinterland of China, approximately 840 kilometers from Shanghai and the sea. Accordingly, the presence of an active naval nuclear reactor, whether in testing or operation, on the Yangtze River would pose significant risks to millions of lives downstream. Although the submarine will be built here, it is possible that the reactor will be installed and fired elsewhere in a certified nuclear handling shipyard, although the entire process seems lengthy. It is also plausible that the submarine involved in the incident was a reissue of a conventional design and not a hybrid nuclear model. Therefore, although the submarine accident actually happened, its nuclear aspect remains unclear.

China’s submarine capability and its implications

This accident has raised questions and concerns about China’s conventional and nuclear submarine capabilities, particularly in relation to regional security. As of 2024, the PLA Navy operates six nuclear ballistic missiles and six nuclear attack submarines. In addition, the company operates nearly 48 diesel-electric boats, about 20 of which are newer Yuan-class submarines.

China plans to build new series of nuclear submarines, including Type 95 attack submarines and Type 96 ballistic missile submarines, and is also already building three nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).

In addition, China plans to build new series of nuclear submarines, including Type 95 attack submarines and Type 96 ballistic missile submarines, and is also already building three nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGNs). . Due to China’s close cooperation with Russia in the Ukraine War, these future boats are expected to be as quiet and capable as Russia’s improved Akula I-class submarines. As a result, the PLA Navy’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 boats by 2025 and 80 boats by 2030, paradigmatically changing the regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

By comparison, India’s submarine force in 2025 will consist of three nuclear-powered submarines and 17 conventional boats, amid an arduously lengthy procurement program to acquire three larger Scorpène-class submarines and six Scorpène-class submarines P-75I class is underway. Even if these two programs are successful, the Indian Navy will continue to face a submarine shortage as nearly 11 diesel-electric submarines in its inventory are nearing retirement. Furthermore, India’s long-range naval missile capabilities remain limited and require urgent deployment of nuclear ballistic missile submarines armed with K-4 and K-5 missiles to provide a credible and effective deterrent ensure.

India’s long-range naval missile capabilities remain limited and urgently require an accelerated deployment of nuclear ballistic missile submarines armed with K-4 and K-5 missiles to ensure credible and effective deterrence.

In conclusion, failure is a fundamental part of experimentation and therefore the Wuhan submarine accident highlights China’s willingness to experiment with developing new boats. Over the years, through iteration and adoption of foreign technology, the PLA Navy has gradually progressed and developed into a formidable fighting force. Therefore, regional powers must prepare diligently to counter China’s naval power in the Indo-Pacific. India would also need forethought and commitment to strengthen its undersea combat capabilities and strengthen its anti-submarine warfare capabilities to address future threats in the Indian Ocean and adjacent waters.

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Atul Kumar is a fellow in the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation

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