For US opponents, Election Day does not mean the end of efforts to influence Americans

WASHINGTON— Soon the ballots will be cast, the polls will be closed and an election campaign marked by assassinations, hostility and fear will come to an end. But for U.S. adversaries, the work to interfere in American democracy may be entering its most critical phase.

Despite all the attention paid to efforts to spread disinformation in the months leading up to the Nov. 5 election, the hours and days immediately after voting ends could provide the best opportunity for foreign adversaries like Russia, Iran and China, or domestic extremist groups , questioning America’s decision.

Then Americans go online to see the latest results or voice their opinions as the votes are tabulated. And that’s when a blurry photo or AI-generated video of alleged election manipulation could do the most damage, potentially turning online outrage into real action before authorities have time to investigate the facts.

It’s a threat taken seriously by intelligence analysts, elected officials and technology executives, who say that while there has already been a steady increase in disinformation and influence operations, the worst may be yet to come.

“It’s not like it’s going to be over at the end of election night, especially given how close this election is going to be,” said Sen. Mark Warner, a Virginia Democrat and chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “One of my biggest concerns is the level of misinformation. Disinformation that could come from our opponents after the polls close could actually be as significant as anything that happens between now and the polls close.”

Analysts are more blunt, warning that particularly effective disinformation could destroy public confidence in the election if it is spread in the hours after the polls close and the group behind the campaign knows it is targeting a particularly important swing state or voting bloc takes aim.

Possible scenarios include out-of-context footage of poll workers repurposed to depict alleged fraud, a deepfake video of a presidential candidate admitting to fraud, or a robocall targeting non-native English speakers warning them about it , to choose.

If a false or misleading claim makes the rounds weeks before the election, local election officials, law enforcement agencies or news organizations have time to gather the facts, correct any falsehoods and spread the word. But if someone distributes a misleading video or photo the day after the election designed to mislead a large portion of the electorate into distrusting the results, it may be difficult or even impossible to uncover the truth.

It happened four years ago, when a drumbeat of lies about the 2020 results sparked the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Often, those arrested for attempting to interfere in the transfer of power have cited debunked election fraud narratives that circulated shortly after Election Day.

A particularly close election decided in some swing states could increase this risk even further, making it more likely that a rumor about suitcases of illegal ballots in Georgia, to take a 2020 example, will have a major impact on the vote perception could have.

President Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump in 2020 was not particularly close, and no irregularities were found large enough to influence the outcome – and yet many supporters of the Republican running for president always believed false claims of election manipulation are still widespread.

The relatively long lead-up to Inauguration Day on January 20 gives those who want to sow doubt about the results plenty of time to do so, whether they are propaganda agencies in Moscow or extremist groups in the US such as the Proud Boys.

Ryan LaSalle, CEO of cybersecurity firm Nisos, said he won’t feel any relief until a new president is sworn in without serious problems.

“Now is the time to stay most focused and transfer power peacefully,” LaSalle said. “Then real activity could take place, and then they would have the greatest chance of having an impact on this peaceful transfer.”

Another risk, officials and tech companies say, is that Russia or another adversary would try to hack into a local or state voting system — not necessarily to change votes, but to trick voters into violating the system’s security to ask question.

“The most dangerous time, in my opinion, will come 48 hours before the election,” Microsoft President Brad Smith told lawmakers on the Senate Intelligence Committee last month. The hearing focused on efforts by American technology companies to protect the election from disinformation and cyberattacks from abroad.

Election disinformation first emerged as a major threat in 2016, when Russia hacked into Democrat Hillary Clinton’s campaign and built networks of fake social media accounts to spread disinformation.

The threat has only increased as social media has become a leading source of information and news for many voters. Content designed to divide Americans and instill distrust in their own institutions is no longer tied to election seasons. Intelligence officials say Russia, China and other countries will only expand their use of online disinformation and propaganda in the future, a long-term strategy that goes beyond a single election or candidate.

Despite the challenges, election security officials are quick to reassure Americans that the U.S. electoral system is resilient to attacks that could change the outcome of the vote. While influence operations may be aimed at stoking distrust in the results, improvements have made the system stronger than ever when it comes to changing votes.

“Malicious actors, even if they tried, could not have enough influence to have a material impact on the outcome of the election,” Jen Easterly, director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, told The Associated Press .