Towards a More Insular America: Japan’s View on the US Election

The race for the 2024 US presidential election is like no other. At the time of the party primaries, the Democratic nominee was incumbent Joe Biden and the Republican nominee was former President Donald Trump. However, Biden’s lackluster performance in the first presidential debate in late June heightened concerns about his age. In July, Trump survived an assassination attempt and emerged as a strong leader, a development that seemingly gave him an overnight advantage. However, as calls for Biden to resign grew within the Democratic Party, the 81-year-old was eventually replaced as presidential candidate by Vice President Kamala Harris, changing the dynamic again.

Opinion polls show Trump and Harris tied in swing states. In the Rust Belt of the Midwest and other battlegrounds, support for the Democratic and Republican parties is evenly matched. It is therefore the undecided voters who decide the outcome of the election. In both swing states and other parts of the country, the economy, followed by illegal immigration, are the issues voters care about. There is therefore no possibility that foreign policy issues – even support for Ukraine and the ceasefire negotiations in Gaza – will become significant factors in the election outcome.

In this article, I will look at what the presidential candidates have said and promised so far, and who advises them, and use that to predict what the United States’ foreign policy might look like after the election. Of course, since both candidates have not yet finalized their transition teams, the assumptions made here are tentative at best.

Harris: An unknown quantity on foreign policy

Kamala Harris, a former district attorney, has no significant philosophy or experience in international relations. While she traveled to Asia and attended security conferences in Europe in her role as vice president of the Biden administration, she did so only as a representative of the president. When Biden put Harris in charge of Central and South American immigration policy, she delivered nothing. Against this backdrop, Harris’ foreign policy is likely to continue on the path set by the Biden administration. It will focus on multilateralism and alliances and address global, cross-border issues such as climate change and disease control. Specifically, she is expected to continue to support Ukraine in partnership with Europe and seek to balance support for Israel and Palestine, while remaining committed to a two-state solution.

While Harris will view China as America’s biggest rival and seek to prevent the flow of cutting-edge technology to that country, militarily she will aim to resolve disputes through deterrence and crisis management. She is also expected to continue supporting Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen its own defense. Harris values ​​multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and the G7, although given the concerns of working families in swing states, she will be forced to distance herself from the CPTPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and other fair-trade deals and market opening agreements .

However, if Harris becomes president, she will be expected to bring her own style to the presidency rather than simply continuing Biden’s foreign policy. She is likely to do more on human rights issues than the current president. For example, India has hit back at Harris’ condemnation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu government. As India’s strategic importance to the United States increases, a Harris presidency could place restrictions on U.S.-India relations and on the Quad (comprising Japan, Australia, India, and the United States), which has a “free and open India-Pacific.” If Harris steps up criticism of China’s human rights abuses against Uyghurs, it will accelerate the escalation of the confrontation between China and the US.

Additionally, the current vice president lacks foreign policy experience, and it is unclear what will happen if she interacts with the likes of Putin and Xi while still wearing her prosecutor’s hat. We cannot rule out that her colleagues will see through her lack of experience. During the 2020 primary, Harris also spoke out against tariffs. She hails from the West Coast of the U.S., which prides itself on a strong trade sector, and voters are watching to see whether she will express an intention to bring about some sort of change in trade policy.

Who Harris appoints as foreign policy adviser is also important. While presidential candidates typically assemble their transition teams in the spring of an election year, the Democratic nominee was selected at the last minute and has not yet assembled a team. Most importantly, there is almost no one around them who could be called a “foreign policy advisor.” Philip Gordon, now national security adviser to the vice president, and other Harris aides are predicted to gain influence. Harris and Gordon share a keen awareness of the limits of American power and a philosophy of self-restraint when it comes to foreign intervention.

While the Biden administration pushed through a bill to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan and was at times overly cautious in supporting Ukraine, these tendencies could become even more pronounced under a Harris presidency. It is possible that President Harris would take an extremely cautious stance toward military intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

An inconsistent Trump camp

What if Donald Trump were re-elected? Based on the former president’s foreign policy record and statements during his first term, it is safe to say that he will increase tariffs and withdraw America from the Paris Climate Agreement once again. When it comes to tariffs, Trump’s main trade policy goal in his first term was to reduce America’s trade deficit. In a second term, his industrial policy would likely focus on restoring domestic industry. He will definitely not join the CPTPP and may even withdraw from the Japan-U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Prosperity Framework on the grounds that it does not give the United States access to foreign markets.

In military alliances with Japan and other nations, Trump is likely to demand that partners make greater financial contributions and be more autonomous as he puts pressure and tough negotiations on countries like Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and other authoritarian states. While Trump has expressed interest in negotiating a ceasefire in Ukraine, he has not said exactly how he would go about doing so.

Within Trump’s circle, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former national security adviser Robert O’Brien are calling for increased military support for Ukraine, while Keith Kellog (national security adviser to Vice President Mike Pence), Fred Fleitz (former chief of staff and (secretary of the National Security Council). ) and others call for the withdrawal of support. It is unclear which side Trump will listen to if he is re-elected.

With regard to NATO, Trump could limit calls for collective self-defense for member states that spend less than 2% of their GDP on defense. In the Middle East, Trump is likely to further increase support for Israel while cutting support for Palestine. He is also against a two-state solution. Furthermore, the former president is an unknown quantity when it comes to East Asia policy. He could maintain his strategic ambiguity and use Taiwan as a diplomatic card in trade negotiations with China. It would also be conceivable that he would enter into arms control negotiations with North Korea, assuming that the country has nuclear weapons.

The Trump camp’s think tank, the America First Policy Institute, which opposes support for Ukraine, has yet to decide on key appointments, including the head of the transition team announced in August. Concrete appointments cannot be expected until after the election, and it is difficult to predict how the balance of power between pro-Trump internationalists and the MAGA camp will currently develop.

The LDP must launch a charm offensive

Finally, let me turn to the United States’ relationship with Japan. While a second Trump administration would present challenges such as tariff policy, the Japanese government always should, thanks to the relationships it has with former ambassador to Tokyo Bill Hagerty (who is considered the favorite to be secretary of state) and other senior officials still have room for negotiation from the last Trump administration.

In the event of a Harris victory, many of the Biden administration’s staff are expected to be retained, so no significant disruption is predicted in the near term. However, there are many in Harris’ own circle, including relatives and California-based contacts, with whom the Japanese side has not yet been able to establish sufficient relationships. These people need to be identified and relationships built.

In any case, Japan’s leader must immediately consolidate his own power base and establish a good relationship with his American counterpart.

(Originally published in Japanese. Banner photo: Former President Donald Trump faces Vice President Kamala Harris in a heated presidential debate in Philadelphia on September 10, 2024. © Reuters.)